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Anscombe on Expression of Intention 
 
 
Of course in every act of this kind, there remains the possibility of putting this act into 
question – insofar as it refers to more distant, more essential ends.... For example the 
sentence which I write is the meaning of the letters I trace, but the whole work I wish to 
produce is the meaning of the sentence.  And this work is a possibility in connection with 
which I can feel anguish; it is truly my possibility...tomorrow in relation to it my freedom can 
exercise its nihilating power. 
 
    –Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 74 
 
 
There might be a verb with the meaning: to formulate one=s intention in words or other 
signs, out loud or in one=s thoughts.  This verb would not be equivalent in meaning to our 
Aintend.” 
There might be a verb with the meaning: to act according to intention; and this would 
also not mean the same as Ato intend.@ 
Yet another might mean: to brood over an intention; or to turn it over and over in one=s 
head. 
 
Wittgenstein, Remarks on Philosophical Psychology I, 830 
 
 
I.  The Problem 
 
Anscombe begins her monograph Intention by recalling three familiar contexts in which, 
as she says, we “employ a concept of intention” ('1): 
 
(Case 1)  Someone says AI=m going to walk to the store@:  An expression of intention, we 
 might  say. 
 
(Case 2)  Someone is walking (or has walked) to the store:  an intentional action. 
 
(Case 3)  AWhy are you walking to the store?@ B ATo get some milk@:  The question seeks 
B and the answer provides B the intention with which something is done.
1 
 
This isn’t philosophy yet, only its raw material.  Anscombe will shortly suggest the need for a 
philosophical investigation by suggesting that we have trouble seeing how it is one concept of 
intention which finds application in these cases.
2  This set-up seems straightforward, yet on 
closer inspection someone might understandably object:  “What an odd mix of cases!”  The first  
  2 
case is a type of act (viz., one of speaking), and, as such, an instance of the second.  Doubtless, 
when performed, it is also done with some further intention (case 3).  So there is overlap here.  
But apart from this, it might be wondered:  Why should expression of intention appear in an 
initial division of the subject at all?  Sure, we put Aa concept of intention@ to work in this context.  
But we put Aa concept of emotion@ to work in speaking of someone=s expressing emotion; and 
that seems unlikely B save in a world described by Borges  B  to head the opening divisions in a 
book called AEmotion.@ 
 
In general, that Aexpressions of Ø@ will be pertinent in studying a psychological concept 
Ø isn=t simply to be taken for granted.  Exceptions would include those concepts taken up in 
performative verbs, where (e.g.) to command or promise is to formulate something in words, to 
give it expression.  But that to intend isn=t a performative is seen among other ways in this, that 
we can speak of expressions of it, though not of a command
3; and from this point of view, it 
seems doubtful that Aexpressing an intention@ has any greater claim to pertinence than, say, 
Abrooding over an intention@ or Aconcealing an intention,@ and so on.  Yet this is Anscombe’s 
first sentence:  AVery often, when a man says >I am going to do such-and-such,= we should say 
that this was an expression of intention@ (p. 1).  Anscombe does not pause here to explain why 
she draws attention to ‘expression’, but instead turns to distinguishing two different uses to 
which (e.g.) AI am going to fail in this exam@ might be put B either (1) an expression of intention, 
or (2) the speaker=s estimate of her chances, a prediction. (p. 2) 
 
Distinguishing expressions of intention from predictions suggests that the two were liable 
to be confused.  So it is in fact a particular sort of >expression= which comes up here, a verbal 
statement of fact.  To explain, we express ourselves, and our states and attitudes express 
themselves, in a variety of ways -- through what we do and say, and through how we do these 
things.  Since we are thus bound to be expressing things continuously, a central distinction in this 
area will be between expression in the impersonal sense (the manifestation of some state or 
condition) and expression in the personal sense (the intentional act of one person directed to 
another).
4  Evidently, Anscombe is thinking of the personal sense, for her examples are all 
imperfect statements of fact (“I’m going to…”)
5 – items which can do double duty for 
predictions -- notwithstanding that intentions are, it would seem, expressed in other ways as well.  
“It would seem”:  In fact, in a passage occurring just after the opening, Anscombe will be found 
denying that intentions, in contrast to other states of the person, are ever impersonally expressed. 
(p.5)  (The meaning of this strange and unintuitive doctrine will occupy us in much of this 
paper.) 
 
To say that Anscombe has inherited this focus on “expression” from Wittgenstein, though 
correct, is obviously not the sort of explanation needed here.
6  And in truth, if the idea were 
merely to locate the topic of intention by remembering some main uses of “intention,” something 
seems forced here.  For we don’t really “very often” speak of “expression of intention” in 
characterizing what people say.  Philosophical purposes aside, we don’t generally speak this way 
unless the context gives special consequence to the distinction between the two kinds of 
expression -- e.g., in the law, which sometimes asks whether an intention (e.g., to take  
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possession) has been expressed (the personal sense), and not merely whether it was evident 
under the circumstances to others. 
 
  What, then, is the meaning of Anscombe’s initial emphasis on ‘expression’?  We aim to 
show the work this notion is performing throughout Intention.  But the background to this task is 
that Anscombe’s first division – expression of intention – seems incongruous.  It seems to belong 
only to a very different catalogue of divisions, one featuring such items as symptoms or 
indications of intention, or intentions which are disguised or merely passively revealed; or 
perhaps in a catalogue of speech-acts -- expressions of belief, predictions, commands, promises, 
etc. 
 
Consider now that rather strange and unintutive passage.  “Expression” recurs 
emphatically here, in the form of a claim made by Anscombe, that while non-human animals 
(brutes) have intentions, they don’t express them: 
 
Intention appears to be something that we can express, but which brutes (which, 
e.g., do not give orders) can have, though lacking any distinct expression of 
intention. For a cat=s movements in stalking a bird are hardly to be called an 
expression of intention. One might as well call a car=s stalling the expression of its 
being about to stop. Intention is unlike emotion in this respect, that the expression 
of it is purely conventional; we might say linguistic if we will allow certain bodily 
movements with a conventional meaning to be included in language. Wittgenstein 
seems to me to have gone wrong in speaking of the >natural expression of an 
intention= (Philosophical Investigations (§ 647) (p. 5). 
 
Someone might read past this unhindered, because they might understandably take Anscombe’s 
point to be merely the anodyne one that brutes do not tell us of their intentions (i.e., express them 
in the personal sense).  But that can’t be her point.  For clearly what this passage is after is a 
contrast between intentions and states of emotion with respect to their possibilities of expression 
(“Intention is unlike emotion in this respect…”).  That anodyne rendering would undo the 
contrast.  For the natural behavior of brutes does express emotion (or so Anscombe allows), yet 
brutes do not tell us of their emotions either.  So Anscombe’s point is best represented -- as she 
herself represents it -- like this:  There is no such thing as the natural expression of intention, as 
there is of emotion; the expression of intention is always conventional or linguistic.  First 
appearances notwithstanding, this is not essentially -- but only by application -- a point about 
non-human animals.  Anscombe might also have said (she should be committed to saying),  “The 
natural behaviour of human beings is no ‘expression’ of their intention as well.”  But the 
question is, why not?  Why say this?  The problem which emerges here, beyond Anscombe’s 
making “expressions” one of the topic’s divisions, is what the relevant notion of “expression” 
might be, such that it has no application to the intentions manifested by an agent’s stalking 
movements, while still finding purchase on the non-verbal manifestations of other states like 
emotion.
7 
 
  The solution to both problems involves seeing Anscombe’s emphasis on “expression” -- 
and more generally her explanation of intention “in terms of language” (p. 86) -- as part of a  
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distinctive strategy for elucidating the unity of the uses of intention.  We’ll call this strategy one 
of immediate elucidation, and we’ll contrast it with Aconnective strategies@.  An immediate 
elucidation exhibits the divisions of intention as inflections of a single form.  It thereby also 
helps reveal how the unity of “intention” has become linguistically submerged, hence lost to a 
philosophically unassisted view.  To explain this, however, it seems best to begin by recalling the 
shape of a prominent strand in contemporary, post-Anscombian philosophy of action, since 
connective strategies appear to be the main ones, or the only ones, imagined there. 
 
 
II.  Background:  The Transformation of Intention 
 
A familiar homage says that many action theorists follow Anscombe at least in (1) 
associating acting intentionally with acting for reasons, (2) treating the topic of intention as 
comprised of this and at least two other divisions (intending to act and ‘intention with which’), 
and (3) requiring philosophy to explain how these notions are connected.  This account of the 
influence of Anscombe’s work is only roughly correct, however.  A sign of inexactness is just 
the way her first division (expression of intention) is apt to be remembered B as e.g., here, by 
Davidson, in recounting his own theory: 
 
[Earlier] I believed that of the three main uses of the concept of intention 
distinguished by Anscombe (acting with an intention, acting intentionally, and 
intending to act), the first was the most basic.  Acting intentionally, I argued... 
was just acting with some intention.  That left intending, which I somehow 
thought would be simple to understand in terms of the others.  I was wrong.  
When I finally came to work on it, I found it the hardest of the three; contrary to 
my original view, it came to seem the basic notion on which the others depend; 
and what progress I made with it partially undermined an important theme...B that 
Athe intention with which the action was done@ does not refer to an entity or state 
of any kind.
8 
 
Loosing reference to “expression,” Anscombe’s first division has become “intending to act” -- a 
hard notion for action theory, as Davidson avers, partly because, being potentially free of any 
contamination by action, it seems to refer to an as yet unanalyzed state of mind.  Moreover, 
given the general drift here – an organization of “intention” around a distinction between worldly 
events and autonomous mental states -- one might understandably speak of just two main 
Anscombian divisions.  Thus, Michael Bratman: 
 
[W]e use the notion of intention to characterize both people=s actions and 
their minds....[O]ur common sense psychological scheme admits of intentions as 
states of mind; and it also allows us to characterize actions as done intentionally, 
or with a certain intention.  A theory of intention must address both kinds of 
phenomena and explain how they are related.  A natural approach, the one I will 
be taking here, is to begin with the state of intending to act.... Instead of beginning 
with the state of intending to act [some theorists] turn immediately to intention as 
it appears in action:  [they] turn directly to acting intentionally and acting with a  
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certain intention....This is, for example, the strategy followed by Elizabeth 
Anscombe in her ground-breaking monograph, Intention.
9 
 
On this reception of Anscombe, the question naturally arises:  Which is the more “basic” notion 
of intention?  For Bratman, as for Davidson, it is “intending to act,” though in analyzing this 
state Bratman goes boldly (where Davidson had gone only reluctantly) beyond mere Adesire@ and 
Abelief@ to a much richer psychology of states, one more adequate to the complexities of action.
10  
The significance of this development will come in for interpretation later on.
11  What matters for 
the moment, however, are only two apparent commonplaces heard in these passages:  first, that 
Aintending to act@ is some state of mind; and second, that action theory should explain how this 
state is related to Aintentional@ as it characterizes things in the “world” -- what people do or cause 
to happen.  We call the framework comprised by these points Transformed Anscombe (TA). 
  
  The steps leading from Anscombe to TA might be thought of as follows: 
 
1.  Noting that Anscombe sometimes calls her first division Aexpression of intention for 
the future@, and sensing perhaps that the invocation of Aexpression@ is not essential here, 
the later term is (understandably) factored-out, leaving Aintention for the future@ (Aprior-
intention@ or Aintending to act@) as the item Anscombe meant to distinguish.
12 
 
2.  This effect of this B and perhaps one of its motivations too B is to give the list a new 
sharpness.  For occupants of the new category B e.g., someone=s intention to fly to Boston 
next week B seem, as such, to be neither intentional acts nor (supposing the agent hasn=t 
yet done anything to realize her intention) any intention in acting.  Naturally, such an 
intention may be taken up B or become present in some way B in her flying to Boston, 
and in the intention with which she does other things, like packing her suitcase.
13  But it 
need not be.  For she may change her mind, or something may interrupt her plans, and 
then her intention to fly to Boston will remain Apure.@        
 
3.  Given the possibility of Apure@ intending, it becomes hard to see how this category 
could fail to designate a mental state, attitude or disposition of some kind.
14  So the 
divisions of Aintention@ now take shape around the philosophical polestar of the division 
between mind and world:  two notions of intention find purchase only where there is 
behavior causing things to happen; a third refers to a mental state, attitude or disposition 
which, though in some way present in such behavior, is also abstractable from it and 
capable of existing on its own. 
 
4.  The theoretical elucidation of Aintention@ is now apt to be organized around two tasks:  
(1) an analysis of Aintention,@ conceived as a (potentially Apure@) mental state or attitude, 
and (2) an explanation of the other behavior-dependant applications of Aintention@ in 
terms of (1).  Theorists are of course apt to disagree about how to carry out these tasks:  
What other mental states or attitudes are entailed by intention, whether some reduction B 
ontological or otherwise -- is possible, and the relation between the relevant state of 
intending and intentional action, are familiar points of controversy.    
  6 
 
5.  Generally, in TA:  (A) An event is an action when it is intentional under some 
description; (B) an action meets this requirement when it is done for reasons; (C) this 
means it is susceptible to a form of rationalization (a special sense of AHe did it 
because...@); and (D) such rationalizations elucidate action through a movement from 
inner to outer:  from the agent=s beliefs, desires or other states to something happening 
outside him.  (Whether either such a movement or its explanation is B in some previously 
recognized sense B a causal one, is another hub of controversy.) 
 
From within this framework, what differentiates Anscombe is commonly thought to be the 
Amethodological priority@ she gives to intention as it appears in action and B curiously, as she 
doesn=t discuss this B her denying that the relation between the mind and action sides of the 
rationalizing Abecause@ is a causal one.
15  Bratman in fact portrays Anscombe as accepting 
everything in (5), with one qualification:  Her view of whether Aintending@ is an independent 
psychological state (not reducible to appropriate desires and beliefs) cannot be made out because 
she says too little about this state.
16 
  
  This story of progress within a single framework of action theory has its obvious 
satisfactions.  Nonetheless, a distortion is present when the contemporary theorist credits 
Anscombe with having discerned the starting points of TA, as described here.  This comes out in 
the following puzzle:  While Anscombe does contemplate intending in its putatively Apure@ or 
unworldly form B 
   
[A] man can form an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, either 
because he is prevented or because he changes his mind:   but the intention itself 
can be complete, although it remains a purely interior thing (p.  9)  
 
-- she offers, as Bratman observes, almost no account of it.  In fact, returning late in the book to 
her first division, Anscombe merely remarks briefly that what has been Asaid about intention in 
acting applies also to intention in a proposed action@ (p. 90).  Here a large gap in her account 
must appear from the contemporary point of view:  How can her previous teachings about 
intentional actions, things done, simply now Aapply@ to an intention in a proposed action, 
conceived as something which may remain Aa purely interior thing@? 
 
By TA=s lights, Anscombe=s previous remarks cover 5A-D.  Beyond identifying the 
central case of intentional action with action for a reason, they explain how when an agent so 
acts he has a further intention, which often furnishes a wider description of what he is doing B 
and related matters.  But surely some further explanation of Aintention in a proposed action@ B 
and not merely an application of these doctrines B was needed, even by Anscombe=s standard of 
compression.  For we can=t understand, say, Aan agents intention to fly to Boston next week@ 
merely on the anemic basis of an agent=s having a reason to do as much, however this notion is 
analyzed.
17  Among the problems, there is the common fact that the agent may simultaneously 
have a reason not to fly to Boston without it being the case that she both intends to fly to Boston 
and intends not to.  Intentions apparently stand open to contradiction in a way which mere  
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reasons do not.  Since what has been said about intention Ain action@ thus seems insufficient to 
cope with intention Ain a proposed action,@ the question arises:  Having distinguished these 
notions of intention, why would Anscombe omit any significant analysis of the latter? 
 
  Two answers appear in the literature.  First, no reason:  Anscombe simply omits to 
discuss intending, leaving it to us.  This seems implausible:  One should really choose between 
making Anscombe the founder of the Three Divisions and having her omit to discuss the first -- 
the combination amounts to philosophical malpractice.  Second, her reason is behaviourist:  She 
thinks we will grasp how to explain intending as some function or complication of intentional 
action, which she takes to be more basic.  This too is implausible:  And are we really to suppose 
that Anscombe (a student of St. Thomas, after all) seeks, with the behaviorist, to solve 
intellectual problems by collapsing spirit into nature? 
 
Significant internal difficulties block the attribution of behaviourism, in any case.  
Anscombe’s forthright talk of intention as Aa purely interior thing@ is one difficulty.  Her pivotal 
remark that what was said about intention in acting Aapplies also to intention in a proposed 
action@ is an even greater one.  For a genuine behaviourist doesn=t talk that way.  He doesn’t say 
that his account of (e.g.) pain-behavior applies also to pain!  The words Aapplies also@ evidently 
say that a distinctive kind of unity is available here:  that which consists in seeing a group of 
items as falling under B or engaging application of – a single idea, form or pattern.  In contrast, 
what the behaviourist needs to say at this point is that the relevant mind-characterizing notions 
can be analyzed or explained in terms of other items.  Otherwise put, the behaviourist is someone 
trafficking in the divisions emerging from TA.  His problem is therefore to connect the different 
notions of Aintention@ through a strategy of explanatory extension; and, in this at least, he will 
differ from other contemporary theorists only in taking for secondary those notions which they 
take for basic.  But in whichever direction it runs, such a connective explanation will be 
something different from what Anscombe appears to contemplate:  an apprehension of the 
divisions of intention as instances of a single form.
18 
 
This explains why the best evidence of behaviorist sympathies in Intention is bound to be 
inconclusive.  For the best (of the thin) evidence must be what Anscombe says just after 
mentioning the possibility of pure intention: 
 
[T]his conspires to make us think that if we want to know a man=s intentions it is 
into the contents of his mind, and only into these, that we must enquire; and 
hence, that if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be investigating 
something whose existence is purely in the sphere of the mind; and that although 
intention issues in actions, and the way this happens also presents interesting 
questions, still what physically takes place, i.e., what a man actually does, is the 
very last thing we need consider in our enquiry.  Whereas I wish to say that it is 
the first. (p. 9) 
 
ASome say A then B, but I say first B then A.”  No doubt, there is a genuine issue of starting 
points here, of what is to be modeled on what.  Anscombe’s remark will suggest behaviorism, 
however, only to someone already sure of the theoretical options:  Either the application of  
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Aintention@ to what people do will have to be explained in terms of its use to characterize a state 
of mind, or vice versa.  There is another possibility, however.  Say that Anscombe=s aim is to 
exhibit the unity of intention directly, by subsuming the three divisions under a single form.  
Once properly in view, it should be possible to see what this form applies to, without further 
complication.  On this reading, AFirst B...@ says only that one doesn=t come to see what formally 
unites the Ainterior thing@ with Aintention in acting@ by asking first what properties characterize 
someone=s psychological state as one of intending; it is rather in action that the genus comes 
most perspicuously into view.  While this might prove an unsatisfying thesis about intention, it 
isn=t exactly novel to suggest that members of a kind have asymmetrical powers of exhibiting it.  
If you want to see why bad arguments are arguments, for example, it is best to start by examining 
the valid kind, this being more basic.  Or, again, successfully murdering is more basic than 
attempting the same.  To see what kind of wrongdoing unites these, it seems best to start with the 
infringement of someone=s right in the completed act; and from here, one can discern the wrong 
in the more attenuated case, without the aid of the sort of theories which would have to say 
(starting at the other end) that, e.g., the wrong in every act of murder is Areally@ only that of 
someone=s intention to murder, plus some causal assistance from the world.  Similarly, on the 
present thesis, what kind of entity or state this is B intending to write the word Aaction@ B will 
best be exhibited in the performance of writing the word Aaction.@
19  This needn’t incur any 
commitment to the behaviourist=s denials. 
 
In support of this:  Anscombe speaks of “intention in a proposed action” (where TA is apt 
to write “intending” or “future-directed intention”).  Her point is that the distinction in question 
here is one between two intentions in action -- items sharing an underlying structure or form, but 
differing in their positions along a spectrum of presence.  On this view, a future intention to write 
the word action, is structurally, a variant of writing the word the action; it is distinguished only 
by its remoteness, by the intended intervention being, as it were, not-yet present.  This will need 
further development:  Just what Anscombe takes this common structure or form to be -- the one 
best exhibited by intention in present action -- remains to be articulated.  But it shouldn=t be 
difficult to guess that the answer will have something to do with the attention she gives to her 
special question >Why?=  This is evidently the central “device” (p. 80) in her ‘non-connective’ 
explanation of the unity of intention.  It also goes hand-in-hand, as will become plain, with her 
emphasis on “expression of intention.”   
 
  Here, however, we reach ahead.  To summarize, the divisions of >intention= being 
connected in TA aren=t, on their face, Anscombe=s divisions.  One can of course ask why 
Anscombe omits to discuss intending, and offers little analysis of this putative state at just the 
point B intention in a proposed action B where analysis seems needed.  But this problem might 
also be turned around.  Despite the standard homage, few theorists actually find much use for 
Anscombe=s first heading, at least as she inscribes it.  Reading them, one would never suspect 
that Aexpression of intention@ figured centrally in her discussion. 
 
 
III.  Why “Expression”:  Three Clues 
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Turning back to the problem of the prominence of ‘expression’ in Anscombe’s initial 
setup, we find two explicit clues in Intention:  (1) Ignoring the expression of intention in favor of 
what it is an expression of is apt to lead to wrong notions: 
 
e.g., psychological jargon about >drives= and >sets=; reduction of intention to a 
species of desire, i.e, a kind of emotion; or irreducible intuition of the meaning of 
>I intend=@ (pp. 5-6). 
   
And (2), it is also apt to obscure just how different expressions of intention are from paradigm 
cases of expressions of states of mind. 
 
(1)  Anscombe’s reference to Wittgenstein’s discussion of  AI was going to....@  B a  
Apure@ intention again, only the time for action is past – pinpoints at least one “wrong 
notion”:  viz., that the truth or assertability of AI=m going [was going] to φ@ consists in 
some occurrent words, images, sensations, or feelings.
20  Against this:  A person=s 
emotions, desires or drives may lead in contrary directions without hint of irrationality; 
not so their intentions.  In addition, one can have an intention over a period of time (e.g., 
to see a friend) while seldom thinking of it; and, in recalling an intention, whatever 
Ascanty@ mental items memory presents as having occurred Ado not add up to@ B they 
aren=t necessary or sufficient for B having that intention.  (Nonetheless one can easily 
enough recall what one was going to do  B one simply gives the words which express 
it.)
21  All this suggests that (unlike, e.g., AI have an itch@ or AIt feels like going down in a 
lift@), AI intend to...@ neither reports an experience-content nor requires an experiential 
vehicle.  To adapt a remark of Anscombe’s adapting a remark of Wittgenstein’s:  No 
experience could be an intention, because no experience could have the consequences of 
intending.
22 
 
(2)   Considering such paradigm cases of the Aexpression@ of an experience or state as 
AOuch!,@ AI=m in pain,@ or AFoiled again!,@ it might be said:  Someone who tells us what 
they are going to do isn=t in that way Aexpressing” an intention; they aren=t simply 
venting.  Indeed, “I’m going for a walk” no more looks like a communication about the 
speaker’s inner state than does, say, her belief that the store closes at 8:00, as expressed 
by means of an appropriate declarative sentence.  Only in special cases does an 
expression of belief aim to inform us about the speaker -- i.e., when it is about her.  So 
too, when someone (actively) expresses an intention, Anscombe says, they give us 
information –right or wrong -- about what is going to happen.  (Of course, biographical 
facts will get passively expressed or manifested as well.)  Herein lies one point of 
likeness with predictions:  An expression of intention such as “I’m going for a walk” is 
true or false according to whether the speaker goes for a walk.
23  Hence, like a prediction, 
it can serve to give someone direct knowledge of what is going to happen.
24  It is not a 
mere indication of the speaker’s psychic condition.  
 
  These considerations – in brief, the dissimilarity of intention to a psychic state on the 
model of emotion -- do suggest some motivation for Anscombe=s emphasis on Aexpression.”  For  
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a personal “expression of intention” clearly makes a kind of claim, and has consequences, 
recognition of which will serve to place intention outside this model.  But without more, these 
points suggest that Anscombe’s peculiar emphasis might be only a dispensable device for 
avoiding certain philosophical errors -- Aparticular dead-ends,” as she calls them (p. 6).  To see 
why these points don’t go far enough, remember that the personal expression of belief is also to 
be understood as presenting a proposition of fact (an answer to the question AWhat did he/you 
say?@); it too is no mere indication of mental goings-ons.  Yet, presumably, this isn’t likely to 
suggest that “expressions” will be a main division in studying belief; that wrong notion, should it 
arise, could simply be dealt with directly.  Why then – apart from the pro-active avoidance of 
errors – should “expressions” figure as one of the main divisions of the topic of intention?  That 
was the problem (§1), and the problem remains.   
 
  The main clue needed here must evidently concern features of intention which are special 
to it, and which therefore generate a special problem.  And there is such a clue, in the low-level 
linguistic facts which suggest divisions of the topic in the first place.  What matters most is just 
that applications of Aintention@ are spread along a spectrum extending from what is, naively 
speaking, Ain the mind@ to what is Ain the world.@  Picturing a line, on the far left will be found 
pure intentions, defined as cases in which the agent intends to do something but hasn=t yet done 
anything else in order to do that.  Moving rightward, the agent has more worldly deeds to show 
for his intentions:  If he is described as Ø-ing or as intending to Ø, then, at this point, it will be 
correct to say that he is also doing various things in order to Ø, or because he intends (wants, 
aims) to Ø.  At the far right, his performance is fully unfolded and finds description in the past 
tense:  AHe Ø-ed@ (or AHe has Ø-ed@) will now be true, and not merely B what holds anywhere 
between these end points B AHe was Ø-ing.@  The special problem, as all agree, is that of 
exhibiting the unity of the notions of intention which appear here. 
   
This progressive structure has no parallel in the case of emotions, desires or beliefs.  
Generalizing this contrast, we may say:  It begins to specify what is meant by a “state” to note 
that the progressive form of the relevant verb B e.g., Ato believe,@ Ato be hungry,@ Ato be taller 
than@ B isn=t used.  To join a subject to such a verb, no grammatical discriminations of 
progressive vs. perfected aspect  (Awas Ø -ing@ vs. A Ø -ed@) are needed, only those of tense; and 
there is always a good inference from the present (AX is hungry...@) to the perfect (AX was 
hungry...@ said at some future time).  States, in short, are static; and this exhibits, by way of 
contrast, two related features of the spectrum of uses of intention. 
 
First, with anything an agent does, there are, in principle, any number of purposive sub-
parts  B things he must do in order to do that B and this is because his performance takes time:
 25  
It may be done quickly (taking little time) or slowly, and we can mark its progress B and thereby 
distinguish further points in our spectrum  B by speaking of someone=s Ajust starting to Ø,@ Abeing 
nearly half-way done,@ Ajust finishing up,@ and so on.  Performances unfold:  They involve a 
diminishing future and a swelling past, of what the agent needs to do in order to do, or have 
done, what he is doing.  States, in contrast, merely go on for a time, without unfolding:  E.g, no 
one will be found slowly desiring a drink, or almost finished being the tallest boy scout B even if 
his desire is soon to be quenched, or others are about to grow.
26  
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Second, the intentional object of AHe intends...@ is given by a performance verb (Ato Ø@), 
so that if someone intends to Ø, then what fits this notional Astate@ of his is another performance 
to which the spectrum of the concept of intention in principle applies (viz., his Ø-ing, or his Z-ing 
in order to Ø), and not, apart from this, any extensionally equivalent state of the world.  Hence 
the object of the attitude of intention is another intention or a performance, whereas what makes 
a belief true (or satisfies a desire) can be propositionally rendered, and is only in special cases 
characterizable through another application of these same concepts:  Not all beliefs are about 
other beliefs, as not all desires could be merely for other desires.  And whatever their causal 
contribution to a particular action, beliefs and desires do not come to serve as qualifications of 
the action itself (e.g., as >beliefish= or >desireous=). 
  Here, then, it looks as if Aintention@ earns its literal, archaic sense B a Astretching forward@ 
B for it is structured as action itself is.  Not that this is surprising:  It is location on a spectrum of 
unfolding action which fits an event to be described using concepts of intention in the first 
place;
27 the kind of thing an intention is to be explained in terms of a concept which applies 
throughout the spectrum.  Anything this wasn=t true of – which didn’t characterize both a 
person’s attitude as well as the object of that attitude -- wouldn=t be our (i.e., a) concept of 
intention.  Anscombe asks: 
 
Would intentional actions still have the characteristic ‘intentional’, if there were no such 
thing as expression of intention for the future, or as further intention in acting?  I.e. is 
‘intentional’ a characteristic of the actions that have it, which is formally independent of 
those other occurrences of the concept of intention? (p. 30)
28 
 
And she answers:  AThis supposition [that intention only occurred as it occurs in >intentional-
action=]...carries a suggestion that >intentional action= means as it were >intentious action=...that an 
action=s being intentional is rather like a facial expression=s being sad.@  This remark traces the 
consequences of losing the unity of the concept of intention across its different contexts:  Cut 
“intention” loose from its unfolding on a spectrum, consider it only as a qualification of action, 
and “intentional” becomes “intentious,” essentially the name of a state, like sad or angry.  By the 
same token, if TA has recently tended to discover that an adequate account of action must go 
beyond states of Ahaving reasons@ conceived as propositional belief-desire pairs, what it has 
caught sight of may be structurally expressed like this:  No psychology will afford the right 
materials for explaining action which does not make use of a concept which applies throughout 
the spectrum of unfolding action, and which thus has same internal complexity as actions 
themselves. 
 
This said, the image of a performance as a line touching points of Apure@ and Aperfected@ 
intention is to be taken with a grain a salt.  What is represented here is not a performance, but 
only the kind of thing a performance is, its structural possibilities.  A few disclaimers will help to 
bring the spectrum into clearer focus: 
  
B First, no implication arises that every action touches the right-most point.  To the 
contrary, as J. L. Austin has observed, a mark of any action is its exposure to the risk of failure or  
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incompleteness.
29  No inference is available from the progressive (AHe is Ø-ing@) to the perfect 
(“He Ø-ed”). 
 
B Likewise, no implication arises that every action begins at the left-most point.  Not all 
intentional action is the execution of a prior intention.  Many intentions -- e.g., rolling out of bed 
in the morning, changing speed according to traffic -- never exist apart from the things one does. 
 
B Third, where there are pure intentions:  No implication arises that they precede acting, 
except relative to some descriptions of the action in question.  To illustrate, someone may have 
now a pure intention to build a tree-house, but only B as is likely B  because he is already 
underway with something else of which building a tree-house is a part or phase:  e.g., he is 
raising his kids to enjoy the outdoors, or improving the property before he sells it so he can retire 
and finish writing his novel. 
       
B Likewise, no implication arises that in achieving the right-most point, there remains 
nothing virtual or pure about what the agent is doing.  To illustrate, even after our agent=s 
intention to build a tree-house has become impure, the point arrives where he forms (what is 
now) a pure intention to buy lumber; failure on this score will mean he never builds a tree house, 
and perhaps never does the things of which this was a part. 
   
   B From the above, it appears that wherever Apurity,@ as defined here, is used to 
characterize intentions, it must be possible to apply the term in the same sense to actions 
themselves.  Consider how it is with our agent who, far along in building his tree house, forms an 
intention to drive in a nail to fasten two boards together.  At the moment, his intention is a Apure@ 
one, for he has taken a break and lies on the grass.  What is this agent, with his nail- and plank- 
regarding intentions, now doing?  Well, among other things, it would be correct to say he is 
building a tree house (he has been at it since winter), only, at the moment, this action of his 
remains pure, for he is not now doing anything in order to do that.  Any action of significant 
duration is apt to have moments of pure intending and pure acting among its innumerable parts.  
  
Notice that our agent=s nail-regarding intention may at present be pure (just like his action 
of building a tree house), though his intention to fix together two boards is impure (he has placed 
them next to each other) B all this, notwithstanding that hammering the nail, fixing the boards, 
and building a tree house are, as Anscombe teaches, the same action under different descriptions.  
So although pure intending comprises the left-limit case, and perfected action the right-limit one, 
this does not entail that what the person purely intends to do isn=t, under a wider description, an 
action which is already underway and uncertain of completion.  Davidson=s own example of a 
pure intention B writing the word Aaction@ B illustrates the point:  I have formed this intention 
because I=m already engaged in writing a sentence, and this with a view to writing a book, the 
second in a series, and so on.  Further, once we are able to locate impure intentions in this way B 
by enlarging the frame of pure ones B it should naturally be possible also to find pure ones within 
impure ones, for the principle is the same.
30  If there is a tendency to think of action in terms of a 
one-way sequence, beginning with intending and moving through acting to having acted B i.e., as 
something beginning in the mind and ending in a state of the world B an illusion is present which  
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perhaps arises from the philosopher=s focus on unmotivated or point-like actions (the lifting of a 
finger) strangely abstracted from the vita activa. 
 
Now, returning to the question of Anscombe= divisions, we venture the following thesis.  
What makes the phrase Aexpression of intention@ look like an outlier in her list B its reference to 
speech B is also what allows it to stand as a natural example of each division, and thus, in a 
sense, to subsume the entire list: 
 
(Case 1)  Someone says AI=m buying some shoes@:  An expression of intention for the 
future (perhaps even a pure one). 
 
(Case 2)  Someone says AI=m buying some shoes@:  An intentional act (e.g., when the 
speaker is asked what he is doing). 
 
(Case 3)  Someone says AI=m buying some shoes@:  A further intention in acting (e.g., 
when this is the answer to the question AWhy are you walking out the door?@) 
 
Not that this is unexpected, as if Aexpression of intention@ should somehow be proprietary to the 
special case of pure intending.  The spectrum of intention -- which exhibits that as a limit case – 
already suggests this wouldn’t be so.  And consider the linguistic facts:  One who offers, e.g., AI 
intend to take the train to Boston tomorrow@ (a pure intention, let us suppose) might also express 
themselves thus:  AI am taking the train to Boston B tomorrow.@  And having begun to pack, they 
might explain what they are doing by reference to the partial presence of that larger performance 
B AI=m taking the train to Boston@ B but they might also revert to the notionally Apsychic@ 
explanation:  AI intend to take the train to Boston.@  If any of these are Aexpressions of intention,@ 
surely all must be. 
  
  The principle of this linguistic sharing of labor is seen, according to Anscombe, when the 
use of the progressive is denied:   
 
[T]he less normal it would be to take the achievement of the objective as a matter 
of course, the more the objective gets expressed only by >in order to= E.g., AI am 
going to London in order to make my uncle change his will=; not >I am making my 
uncle change his will.= (p. 40) 
 
Likewise, the less normal it would be to take the achievement as a matter of course, the more the 
objective (Ain order to Ø”) gets expressed with “because” followed by a proposition which 
couples the performance verb (to Ø) with some overtly psychic form (>I intend ...= I want ..@ AI 
plan...@,  etc.):  “I am going to London because I intend [want, will try, etc.] to make my uncle 
change his will.”  Where ordinary language demands them, such “psychic” expressions are 
markers of absence or remoteness in an unfolding performance.  But in this, they are exactly like 
the idiomatic use of the simple progressive (AI am Ø-ing@), which itself always conveys 
imperfect aspect, incompleteness and the risk of failure (only to a different degree).  All 
expressions of intention, then, are such as to explain action by locating it within a larger action- 
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in-progress.  Where Apsychic@ markers of remoteness are available, however, we can expect the 
use of the simple progressive to be correspondingly confined to a narrower range of cases 
exhibiting relative presence or proximity.
31 
 
This explains a critical remark of Anscombe=s.  After (1) connecting the notion of 
intentional action to the applicability of a special question >Why?=, and (2) showing how an 
answer can furnish terms for a wider description of what an agent is doing (i.e., just when the 
question has the right sense), and (3) noting that this leads, chain-wise and eventually, to Aa 
break,@ to an act-description characterisable, on account of remoteness, only as something the 
agent is now going (or B we may add B intending, wanting, planning, etc.) to do, she writes: 
 
I do not think it is a quite sharp break.  E.g., is there much to choose [i.e., 
in answer to why someone is putting on the kettle] between >She is making tea= 
and >She is putting on the kettle in order to make tea [and, we may add, AShe 
intends to make tea@? – our note] B i.e., >She is going to make tea=?   Obviously 
not.  (p. 40).   
 
The implication of this is that the notionally mind-characterizing uses of intention differ from the 
others only in articulating a greater degree of remoteness or uncertainty.  That is, they continue B 
at a different point in the spectrum B the same form of explanation which was most 
perspicuously seen in the earlier links of the chain:  essentially, the fitting of an action into a 
larger, presently incomplete whole.  Call this the teleological structure of action:  Action is the 
kind of thing which rationalizes its sub-parts (those actions done Ain order to@ do it).  As Michael 
Thompson has argued, this suggests that it is fundamentally intentional actions-in-progress 
which explain actions, and that it is only on the basis of this primitive structure B an action as a 
space of reasons B that a more sophisticated development becomes possible:  viz., the joining of a 
psychic expression with a performance verb to create an etiolated form of the same structure in 
the interest of articulating relative non-presence, remoteness or uncertainty.
32  
 
  In support of this, it bears remembering that the psychological items under consideration 
are someone=s intending, planning or wanting to do something (to Ø) and not, say, someone’s 
wanting or desiring that something or other happen or be the case.  The progress noted earlier in 
TA toward more committed or articulated psychological states (beyond belief and desire) was 
just the recognition that only states of mind having a role in the unfolding of action itself B which 
means only >states= subject to qualification (i.e., to placement on the spectrum) as Apure/impure@ 
B can effectively explain action by reference to the agent=s attitudes.
33  But this just means that 
such states – intending to__, planning to__, etc. -- inherit through their objects (a performance-
form: to Ø) the distinctive teleological structure characteristic of intentional action.  And this 
suggests that no matter how rich a psychology we employ, we do not attain to an understanding 
of the behavior-characterizing uses of Aintention@ on the basis of relation to a psychological state, 
except by helping ourselves to a notion of a >state= informed by a prior understanding of the 
concept of intentional action (as in intending or planning to do something). 
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   To summarize:  “I intend (plan, want, etc.) want to make tea” expresses the same 
incompleteness of action seen B at earlier points in the chain of answers, where achievement is 
more “a matter of course” B in the use of a performance verb by itself:  E.g., “Why are you 
boiling water?” –“I’m making tea.”  “And why are you making tea?” –“I intend to serve the 
guests.”  Hence all such psychic forms are performance modifiers:  Insofar as they are 
employable in action-explaining answers to the question AWhy?,@ they express forms of being 
on-the-way-to-but not-yet having Ø-ed, of already stretching oneself toward this end.  So 
expressions of intention “for the future” are variations on a common theme:  They are 
structurally of a piece with the simple progressive, only further to the left on the spectrum, where 
they permit a more refined articulation of the imperfection – an agent’s being commitedly 
underway – informing all action explanation.  In expressing imperfection, they are just like any 
other suitable answer to the question AWhy?, whether this be a declaration of what one will do, a 
description of what one is currently doing, an account of the intention with which one is doing 
something, an explanation of what one desires or is trying to do, or B think of Anscombe=s 
shopping list (p. 56) B a specification of what one is to do.  The logical relations between these 
expressions of intention aren’t themselves very important.  As a matter of ordinary language, 
they admit of no exact relative placement on the spectrum, though they are of course open to the 
stipulations of the philosopher whose purposes require more precision. 
 
IV.  Expressions of Intention:  The general and the special use 
 
   Conceived as an answer to the question “Why?,” “expression of intention” is clearly a 
capacious notion (any item on the spectrum can be represented as such an answer),
34 and it is 
this capaciousness (the power to exhibit what is structurally common to any use of intention) 
which recommends “expression of intention” for Anscombe=s purposes.  On this conception,
there could be no question of finding out what an expression of intention is by first investigating
the properties which characterize a psychological state as one of intention, as if the powers this 
state might have to rationalize what someone does might then remain open for investigati
Anscombe=s focus makes us take things the other way around:  What can and does count as an 
agent=s Aexpression of intention@ is determined by its availability to enter into an elucidative 
account of action (fitting it into a whole-in-progress), its suitability, in other words, to be given 
to another who asks what is going on.  An intention is whatever can be given to another in an 
expression suited to play this role. 
 
 
on.  
 
The special problem addressed by this account arises from the tendency for the continuity 
of uses of Aintention@ to get disguised:  “Intend@ looks like a state (like “believe”) and this sets 
the problem of its connection to Aintentional@ as applied to things getting done.  Indeed, by at 
least one criterion, Ato intend to Ø@ should designate a state, since an inference from the present 
(AHe intends to Ø@) to the perfect (AHe intended to Ø@) does hold, and since, unlike a 
performance, intending to Ø does not B notwithstanding the colloquial use of the progressive B 
take time.
35  On the other hand, the fact that Aintending@ (like any psychic verb put to 
employment in explaining action) takes a performance-form rather than a proposition as its 
object seems to mark a decisive difference.  This is related to two features of Aintending@ which 
would make it quite special among states, but which are commonplaces of performances.  First,  
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we can ask Awhy@ (for what purpose, with what intention) someone intends to Ø, just as we can 
ask this about action itself.  (All intentions are like actions in this way:  they are explained by B 
and they explain B other actions and other intentions.)  Second, intending to Ø, being thus 
something voluntary, is subject to being commanded, like any action.
36  
 
Taking it that such differences are what matter (and not what label one applies), we 
propose the following account of the significance of Aexpression of intention@ for Anscombe. 
 
First, although Anscombe quickly leaves her first division (‘expression of intention for 
the future’) aside till later, a distinctive form of verbal exchange remains a pervasive feature of 
her exposition:  AWhy are you lying there?@ --AI=m doing Yoga@; AWhy did you pump water this 
morning?@ --ATo poison that lot, don=t you know?@; AWhy worry about them?@ --AThose people 
have strangled the country long enough, I intend to get the good people in.”  All of the positive 
answers in such interrogations are Aexpressions of intention,@ not just the last answer (an 
intention for the future): 
 
[I]f a description of some future state of affairs makes sense just by itself as an 
answer to the [‘Why’] question, then it is an expression of intention.  But there are 
other expressions of the intention with which a man is doing something:  for 
example, a wider description of what he is doing.  For example, someone comes 
into a room, sees me lying on a bed and asks >What are you doing?=  The answer 
>lying on a bed= would be received with just irritation; an answer like >Resting= or 
>Doing Yoga=, which would be a description of what I am doing in lying on my 
bed, would be an expression of intention.@  (pp. 34-35) 
 
So Aexpression of intention for the future@ is one species of a common genus, that of positive or 
action-elucidating answers to the special question AWhy?@  Recall the role of that question.  It 
provides a definition of an Aintentional act@ in terms of the applicability of a question to which 
the agent can always give some knowledgeable response.  Given this, it should be possible to see 
that Aexpression of intention@ (in the wide, generic sense) works to exhibit the unity of the three, 
initially disparate-seeming divisions.  This is just what Anscombe says:   
 
To a certain extent the three divisions of the subject made in ' 1, are simply 
equivalent.  That is to say, where the answers >I=m going to fetch my camera= 
[expression of intention for the future], >I am fetching my camera= [intentional act] 
and >in order to fetch the camera= [further intention in acting] are all 
interchangeable as answers to the question >Why= (p. 40).
37 
 
On this account, the unity of the divisions lies both in the applicability of the question Awhy@ to 
the material of each, and in the suitability of each to itself rationalize action B i.e., to figure in an 
agent=s answer to the question Awhy,@ asked about something else he is doing (in the present 
example, his going upstairs).  That is, the unity of the divisions is seen in the fitness of their 
corresponding linguistic expressions  B AI=m going to Ø,@ “I=m Ø-ing,@ A...in order to Ø @ B to 
provide elucidatory responses in a special interrogation of the agent.  
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“Expression of intention@ thus finds a narrower and a broader use in Intention:  narrower, 
as one of the headings  B Aexpressions of intention for the future@ B which brings the topic 
provisionally into view; more broadly, as the genus B comprised of answers to the question 
AWhy?@ B which formally unites the three divisions.  This way of putting things seems to reverse 
Anscombe=s better known formula, according to which an intentional action is one subject to the 
question AWhy?@  But the possibility of such reversal is implicit in the chainlike structure of what 
Anscombe calls  Athe ABCD form@ (p. 45), whereby a positive answer to the question AWhy?@ is 
itself the description of an intentional action, and, as such, subject to that question.  Starting, 
then, with an intentional action, we can move forward along the chain by interrogating the action 
-- “Why?”  For just when this question has the relevant sense, positive answers to it are 
themselves expressions of the agent’s intention.
38  But, starting from the same point, we can also 
move backwards along the chain, by remembering that an action, suitably described, is something which 
can be an agent=s answer to the question AWhy?@ (i.e., asked about something else he is doing).  
Anscombe=s ABCD form thus pictures intentional action as both ground and grounded, 
explanans and explanandum, something both subject to, and responsive to, a distinctive 
interrogation.  And this is represented by saying that the unity of the three divisions lies in their 
fitness to appear in Aexpressions of intention@ in the generic sense:  answers to the question 
AWhy?@  
 
Summarizing, Anscombe’s basic idea – her general strategy for discharging the 
explanatory task set in §1 of Intention -- is this:  (1) The applicability of the relevant question 
“Why” is what marks anything out as an expression of intention (p. 90); (2) any expression of 
intention thus subject to the question “Why” is fit also to answer a serially related question 
“Why”; and (3) the unity of the trinity – intention in a proposed action, intention in a present 
action, and intentional action – is seen in this, that each is capable of being represented in an 
“expression of intention,” furnishing an answer to a question “Why.”  Thus represented (as 
answers in the interrogation of action), the three divisions are generally interchangeable:  
Usually, “there isn’t much to choose between them.” (p. 40) 
 
  
V.  AIn terms of language@ 
 
At this point, a contemporary action theorist might still ask:  Why define intentional 
action Ain terms of language@ (p. 86) B a chain of questions AWhy?@  Obviously, the content of 
such exchanges B e.g., AWhy are you lying on the bed?@ BA I=m doing Yoga@ B might always be 
exhibited, apart from the interrogative context, in a variety of ways, e.g., AA is lying on the bed 
because she is doing (she intends/wants to do) Yoga.”  Such actions can and do take place 
without anyone making any speeches!
39  Wouldn’t it be less obscure to factor out reference to 
questions and answers, and speak instead of intentional action as (e.g.) Aaction for a reason@?  
AExpression of intention,@ in that case, needn=t get any special emphasis. 
 
One answer to this challenge lies simply in the fruitfulness of Anscombe’s expository 
procedure in revealing unity in the otherwise diverse materials of action (cf. p. 80).  Still, 
confidence in this procedure would improve if it became clearer how the specifically linguistic  
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representation of intention really is an aspect of the thing represented.  A further answer might 
run:  AIntentions, like other conditions of the person, may intelligibly be attributed only insofar as 
they are publicly expressed.”  True enough.  But Anscombe=s expository procedure involves 
Aexpressions@ of a quite special sort, those suited, we may now say, to be a person=s answers to a 
question addressed to him.  No one will be tempted to think of “expressions” in this sense as the 
only or canonical way in which various other conditions of the person get revealed.  Is there a 
reason to think that intention is different? 
  
Return to that strange passage concerning animals (§ I).  Here Anscombe does appear to 
say that intention is different in this respect, and she even pauses to correct Wittgenstein on this 
point.  Wittgenstein had written: 
 
What is the natural expression [Ausdruck] of an intention?  B Look at a cat when 
it stalks a bird; or a beast when it wants to escape.  ((Connection with propositions 
about sensations.))
40  
 
But this Agoes wrong,” according to Anscombe:  The expression of intention Ais purely 
conventional@ or Alinguistic.@  Animals thus Ahave intentions@ but, lacking language, don’t 
express them.
41  What makes this proposition strange is that while Anscombe (1) recognizes that 
intentions are manifest in non-verbal behavior without further gloss
42; and (2) allows the term 
“expression” application to the natural manifestation of other states (like emotion); she 
nonetheless (3) challenges Wittgenstein on this point:  An animal’s behavior isn’t any expression 
of its intention.  Taking it that Aexpression of intention” is a device for exhibiting the unity of 
“intention”, this further problem is raised here:  Is there a way of seeing Anscombe=s Proposition 
   
AP:  There is no such thing as the natural (only the linguistic) expression of intention 
 
as informative rather than merely stipulative?  A positive answer would make clearer how the 
representation of intention “in linguistic terms” comes, so to speak, with the matter itself. 
 
To begin with, however, a few words about what this question is not.   
 
As was said, questions concerning an animal=s capacities aren=t essential here.  We are 
familiar in the human case with the distinctions -- expression vs. other indications, natural vs. 
conventional expressions – invoked by Anscombe.  Among us, there are both verbal and non-
verbal expressions of fear, for instance.  So if the expression of intention is purely linguistic, then 
it must be true of the man, and not just of the beast, that the movements of stalking a prey (or 
catching it and hauling it back to camp, etc.) aren’t to be considered “expressions” of intention, 
notwithstanding that these movements make intentions manifest.  Anscombe’s point applies to 
all animals if it applies to any. 
  
Similarly, questions concerning whether non-linguistic creatures can be credited with 
having with intentions at all remain bracketed here.  Negative judgments might seem to support 
Anscombe=s linguistic procedure, since they often derive from a focus on the formation of plans,  
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or standing intentions B cases in which the basis for attributing intentions must go beyond natural 
behaviour.
43  But not all intentions are standing ones or the result of making plans.  And 
Anscombe’s challenge to Wittgenstein, in any case, does not concern some purer type of 
standing intention, but just the immediate intentional action of the cat stalking the bird.  To speak 
of Aexpression@ in this case would be as inapt – she says -- as calling Aa car=s stalling the 
expression of its being about to stop.@  Unobvious as this thesis is, it expresses no skepticism 
about the car=s being about to stop, or about the engine evincing this fact.  Likewise, Anscombe 
nowhere denies (rather, she consistently asserts) that the structures of action uncovered in her 
investigation apply beyond the human world. (p. 86-7) 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that Anscombe’s remarks on animals run contrary to recent 
arguments which enlist one of her ideas B viz., that actions are intentional Aunder a description@ B 
in recommending the conclusion that neither intentions nor propositional attitudes are possible 
for creatures without a language.  Davidson writes: 
 
One can intend to bite into the apple in the hand without intending to bite 
into the only apple with a worm in it [...] The intensionality we make so much of 
in the attribution of thoughts is very hard to make much of when speech is not 
present.  The dog, we say, knows that its master is home.  But does it know that 
Mr. Smith (who is his master) or that the president of the bank (who is that same 
master), is home?  We have no real idea how to settle, or make sense of, these 
questions.
44 
  
The intensionality of intentions does suggest that the capacity to recognize intentions in others is 
exclusive to the talking creatures, or those who interpret the talk of others.  But if a creature does 
not recognize intentions, must it therefore have none of its own?
45  Notably, Anscombe insists 
that whatever may be >language-centered= in her account, and whatever the role of particular 
descriptions in delineating the intentional aspects of action, we do discern intentions in non-
talking creatures: 
 
It sounds as if the agent had a thought about a description. But now let=s suppose 
that a bird is landing on a twig so as to peck at bird-seed, but also that the twig is 
smeared with bird-lime. The bird wanted to land on the twig all right, but it did 
not want to land on a twig smeared with bird-lime. [...] Landing on the twig was 
landing on bird-lime B we aren=t considering two different landings. So, if we 
form definite descriptions, Athe action (then) of landing on the twig@, Athe action 
(then) of landing on a twig with bird-lime on it@, we must say they are definite 
descriptions satisfied by the same occurrence, which was something that the bird 
did, but under the one description it was intentional, under the other unintentional. 
That the bird is not a language-user has no bearing on this.
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We say the bird is intentionally landing on the twig (but not on the lime-twig) because we can 
see that >landing on a twig to peck at bird-seed= answers to purposes the bird is assumed to have, 
whereas >...a twig smeared with lime= does not, even though we are talking about one and the  
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same twig.  We seek a description which makes what the bird did comprehensible within what 
we know the bird is seeking.  A reference to the agent and its good does operate as a constraint 
here, but this needn=t be a reference to the agent=s psychology narrowly conceived, i.e., to what is 
thought or said.  Rather, we apply the descriptions under which the creature=s action is 
intentional, without supposing that the creature has such descriptions >in mind=. 
 
In sum, various questions concerning the attribution of intention to animals don’t shed 
light on Anscombe’s strictures on what an expression of intention can be.  What could be at stake 
for her in refusing to apply the innocuous-sounding phrase “the natural expression of intention@ 
both to humans and other animals?  That is the nub of the problem. 
 
VI.   What natural indications can’t do:  Contradiction, Commitment, Impugning the Facts 
 
One possibility should be ruled out.  Anscombe had better not be found saying that by 
“expression” she simply means expression in the personal sense.  From this it would of course 
follow that animals do not express intention, for to express intention (or anything else) you’ve 
got to use language.  But this would be mere stipulation.
47  Against this, let it be clear that 
anyone can call non-verbal manifestations of intention “expressions” if they like – what to call 
things isn’t the question.  The question is what distinction Anscombe seeks to mark by refusing 
application of “expression” to natural manifestations of intention.
48  It looks like the answer must 
be:  some distinction between the verbal and non-verbal manifestation of (1) intention on the one 
hand, and of (2) emotion (and other states) on the other.  But what distinction?  If a creature’s 
stalking its pray is not to be considered an expression of intention, the interest of this thesis – 
what raises it above empty stipulation -- must derive from a distinction we recognize here.   
 
But there is a distinction to recognize here:  Between natural behaviour which manifests 
intention and the overt verbal expression of intention, there exists a gap in logical powers, 
without parallel in the case of emotion or other states.   
 
To explain, it seems natural to speak contrastingly of natural and conventional 
“expressions” of, say, fear, precisely because, in this case, conventional expression can take up 
or perform the same work as natural expression – there is no gap.  Otherwise put, the contrast 
(natural/conventional) is at home within a space of common functions, where verbal expression 
continues (while also enhancing and rendering more precise) the same functions more 
primitively available by natural means.
49  The other’s frightened look and his “I’m afraid” can 
convey the same thing – his fear.  This isn’t to say that natural expressions of fear are given to 
another or meant to inform him.  But conventional expressions of fear aren’t always given 
either.
50  When they are, however – and this is what matters here – what they overtly convey is 
what might also be read in the speaker’s non-linguistic behaviour.  Verbal expressions of 
intention, in contrast, do not ever stand in for intentional behavior in this way.  Certainly it would 
be wild to suggest that they are “learned as a substitute” for intentional behavior – one point 
subserved by the phrase “natural expression” as applied by Wittgenstein to emotions and 
sensations.
51  And as Wittgenstein himself notes, there isn’t any distinctive behavioral repertoire 
of intentional action, as there is of emotional states and feelings.
52  No, the relation between 
verbal expressions of intention and intentional behavior is different than the relation between  
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(e.g.,) verbal expressions of fear and natural fear-behaviour.  It is this:  When an intention is 
verbalized, it specifies the performance to which the agent is committed in the future, or in which 
he is already engaged, and that performance may then be judged correct or mistaken in light of 
what is expressed. 
 
So Anscombe is right to mark a difference here.  Rather than standing in for 
performances in either a logical or developmental sense, expressions of intention have a force 
which no bit of natural behavior could have.  Specifically, they make contradictable claims, and 
they require that something else one does then be regarded as correct or mistaken.  Of course, we 
can sometimes see directly that someone is naturally barking up the wrong tree – say, merely 
running the brush along the wall when they mean to be painting the room yellow.  But here it is 
important that we grasp a particular description of what they are doing or intending to do, one 
which a human being could give in answer to the question “Why?”
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  To develop the implications of this, a number of contrasts, so far mainly implicit in our 
discussion, may now be made more explicit.  The upshot is that a number of related features -- 
contradictability, claiming, commitment, and the impunging of performances – can be seen to 
make intention fit for a notion of “expression” which lacks a non-linguistic counterpart.  
 
  1.  Intentions are contradicted by other intentions.  Midway through the book, 
Anscombe asks, “What is the contradictory of a description of one’s own intentional action?” 
and she answers: 
 
The contradiction of ‘I’m replenishing the house water supply’ is not ‘You aren’t, 
since there is a hole in the pipe’, but ‘Oh, no, you aren’t’ said by someone who 
thereupon sets out e.g., to make a hole in the pipe with a pick-axe.  And similarly, 
if a person says ‘I am going to bed at midnight’, the contradiction of this is not: 
‘You won’t, for you never keep such resolutions’, but ‘You won’t, for I am going 
to stop you’. (p. 55) 
 
To contradict an expression of intention is intentionally to oppose the act which the agent 
declares herself to be engaged in – i.e., what the agent is intent upon -- rather than to assess the 
agent’s states, dispositions, or other conditions affecting the likeliness of performance.  Verbal 
expressions of emotions and desires can also be contradicted of course, but what is denied, in 
that case, is the claim that the speaker has the item in question.  Contradicting an agent’s 
expression of intention to V, in contrast, leaves no doubt – indeed, it presupposes – that she has 
the intention. 
 
  2.  Like a belief, the expression of intention makes a claim upon the world.  From (1), it 
follows that when Anscombe speaks of ‘expression of intention’ as something that can be true or 
false, this means a true or false claim about what one is doing or will do, not a good or a bad 
indication of one’s state of mind.  Herein lies the aspect of intention which leads some theorists 
to see it as a kind of belief.  If an ordinary assertion (“The train just left”) is one canonical form 
of the expression of belief, its contradiction is the denial of what is claimed (“No, it hasn’t left 
yet”), not the denial that this expression manifests the speaker’s state of mind.  Expressions of  
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both belief and intention make claims which can be countered by the denial that things are or 
will be as they are declared to be. 
 
3.  Yet, unlike a belief, the expression of intention can impugn what one does.  Against 
this background, Anscombe distinguishes an expression of intention, not only in terms of the 
applicability of the question “Why?” (p. 90), but also, initially, in terms of the impugning of 
performances:   
 
If I don’t do what I said, what I said was not true. [...] But ... this falsehood does not 
necessarily impugn what I said.  In some cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for 
not being in accordance with the words, rather than vice versa.  This is sometimes so 
when I change my mind; but another case of it occurs when, e.g., I write something other 
than I think I am writing: as Theophrastus says, the mistake here is one of performance, 
not of judgment.” (pp. 4 - 5). 
 
Putting this in terms of the previous point concerning contradiction, we may say:  To contradict a 
prediction (or other expression of belief) is merely to deny a proposition of fact; to contradict an 
expression of intention is also to oppose what someone is doing or will do  This specifies a 
discontinuity between expressions and mere behavioural ‘indications’ of intention.  Anything 
which serves to indicate something (like the animal’s intention to escape) will itself be the thing 
faulted or impugned when it fails to conform to what was putatively indicated.  Where there is a 
clash between an indicator and what it purports to indicate, it is the indicator which stands to be 
corrected. 
  
  4.  Practical knowledge:  Expressions of intention are distinguished by the possibility of 
“mistakes in performance” and not otherwise by their “direction of fit.”  The last point touches 
on a larger theme of Anscombe’s:  No statement will count as an expression of intention unless it 
expresses “practical knowledge.”  If, for example, the speaker says “I’m going to crush the snail” 
(or “I am crushing the snail”) on the basis of his observation of forces impelling him to move, 
then this is no expression of his intention.  Now in speaking of expressions of intention as 
expressing practical knowledge, Anscombe might be taken to mean, in part, that the fit between 
such knowledge and what is known runs in the opposite direction than it does in cases of belief.  
This comes out when the speaker is not in fact doing what he takes himself to be doing.  Here, if 
the speakers words are an expression of intention (rather than, e.g., a prediction), then the 
mistake will lie not in what the speaker thinks or says, but in what he is doing (“the mistake here 
is one of performance not of judgment”).
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   Understandably, then, an enduring legacy of Anscombe’s monograph is the idea of 
“direction of fit.”  The only disappointing aspect of this legacy is that the phrase “direction of fit” 
doesn’t actually occur at its source -- and for good reason:  While any talk of “knowledge” must 
find room for application of an idea of fit or accord, the fit present in cases of practical 
knowledge (or absent in cases of its failure) isn’t simply a matter of reversing the priority 
between the same two items which figure in cases of speculative knowledge; practical 
knowledge involves a distinctive class of items known.  Unsurprisingly, then, Anscombe’s 
distinction bears little resemblance to the contemporary one between the functional roles of  
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belief and desire, defined in terms of different directions of fit between such states and “the 
world.”  Instead of “two directions,” Anscombe speaks of a difference between a mistake in what 
was said and a mistake in performance.   
 
What turns on this?  Three things: 
 
   (A)  From expression of intention to desire.  The “fit” which concerns Anscombe 
involves conformity between an expression of intention – something said – and what the person 
actually does.  In the contemporary functionalist account, by contrast, the focus is no longer on 
verbal expressions, but on states of belief and desire, the later being defined by the requirement 
of the world (or “the facts”) conforming to fit it rather than vice versa.   
 
 (B)    From action to “the world”.  With this shift in focus from intentions to desires goes 
naturally a transformation in how the other side of the relation -- the world – is understood as 
well.  When Anscombe speaks of “the facts [being]... impugned for not being in accordance with 
the words,” the facts in question are someone’s performance.  But in the contemporary account, 
instead of a ‘mistake in performance’ -- an action characterized as needing correction -- we are 
referred to some state of the world itself (e.g., the absence of the cool drink I am longing for) that 
is to be altered, made to conform to the state of desire.   
 
 (C)    Disappearance of the notion of “mistake”.  With the foregoing shifts in the nature of 
the relata (a person’s state rather than his statements, this state’s relation to some state of the 
world rather than to the person’s actions), the idea of “mistake” or “correction” disappears from 
the analysis.  For there is no mistake on anyone’s part, mine or God’s, when something I desire 
is out of reach; and the facts comprising this aspect of the world are in no way impugned by my 
desire or its expression.  Rather, my having this desire simply means, other things being equal, 
that I will strive to alter these facts in order to satisfy my desire.   
 
  Given this, it is perhaps easy to see why the contemporary functional account of desire in 
terms of “direction of fit” between a person’s state and the world -- does not appear in 
Anscombe, though it is widely attributed to her.  Very simply, it is difficult to see how we are to 
apply normative notions to either item.  In contrast, the application of “mistake” to actions and 
statements -- things done and said -- remains straightforward:  These are the very things to which 
notions of mistake, correction, rightness, etc., primarily apply.
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  5.  Commitment.  Various theorists have seen in intentions a form of “commitment,” even 
though “I’m going to...”  is not a performative utterance, and the relevant notion of commitment 
is different from promissory commitment.  (Anscombe’s denial that there are natural expressions 
of intention would be straightforward if expressions of intention were performatives, speech-acts 
dependent on conventional means). But although expressions of intention are not performatives, 
there is nonetheless a sense in which all intentions involve performances.  For from (1) above – 
to contradict an intention is to oppose an agent’s action – it follows that an agent’s expression of 
intention is itself a kind of engagement to act, not a mere revelation of his state of mind. 
(Contradiction is symmetrical.)  Self-contradiction in intentions exhibits the same pattern.  If my 
intention to fly to Boston conflicts with my intention to stay home this weekend, this is not  
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because these two intentions characterize my state of mind as one which dooms me to some 
frustration whatever happens (as happens with conflicting desires).  It is rather that I engage 
myself in both doing and not-doing the same thing.   
 
  The way even pure intentions involve commitment is thus perhaps best understood in 
terms of the commisive aspect of action itself.  Consider someone now engaged in writing the 
word “action.”  That is how someone who merely intends to write the word ‘action’ is also 
engaged:  He stretches himself toward the act, awaits himself in its successful completion.
56  The 
structure of intending to act, this is to say, is that of a performance, and, as such, something 
continuous with intentional action itself. 
 
   Of course, an intention for the future may be cancelled, blocked or otherwise never 
realized.  Hence an objection arises here.  What sort of ‘commitment’ is it which can be 
unilaterally rescinded by the agent, without penalty, simply by a change of mind?
57  This 
argument proves too much, however.  If it implies there is no sense of ‘commitment’ 
independent of obligation, it will follow that even someone now doing X – say, conducting a war 
in a foreign country -- hasn’t committed themselves to anything.  For this action may also be 
cancelled or blocked at any stage before its perfection.  The completion of any extended action 
requires the agent’s continuing assent; as Sartre puts it, there always remains the possibility of 
“putting [the] act into question.”
58  So the fact that an agent may change his mind doesn’t 
distinguish the commisive quality of pure intending from those paradigmatic commitments 
which are his temporally extended actions.  Remembering the idea of spectrum at work here, we 
therefore affirm that a good analogue of ‘intending’ can be found in someone’s doing 
something.
59   
   
  Less metaphorically, the point is just that intention in a future action does not differ 
fundamentally from intention in (a present) action, or from intentional action.  All alike, as 
Anscombe taught, are fit to be taken up in “expressions of intention,” conceived as answers to 
the question “Why?”  All alike are engagements of agency, and enter into the structure of 
commitment, contradiction, and impugning which characterizes performances as opposed to 
paradigmatic ‘states.’ All involve an agent stretching toward a describable future which is not-
yet.
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  To summarize:  With the verbal expression of intention a discontinuity with natural 
manifestation arises, and it is this which Anscombe seeks to mark.  Such expressions introduce 
something new:  a characterization of what one is doing – what larger action one’s actions are 
part of or toward which they are aimed.  Expressions of intention are thus ‘world-directed,’ but 
not just in the way that expressions of states like belief or hope are:  They make possible the 
application of the notion of “mistake” to performances, and they express practical commitments. 
   
VII.  Homage Revisited 
 
In conclusion, (1) three overlapping ways of making more precise the necessity of 
representing intention in terms of its verbal expression, and (2) a comment on one prominent 
theme.   
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 (1) First, it might be said that only verbal expressions of intention exhibit the 
responsiveness of the person to the special question >Why.@  This question may apply to the bird 
pecking at the lime twig as much as to the man putting on his coat.  The man, however, is in a 
position not only to answer the question, but also to refuse it application in a given formulation, 
as when he says that, as described in those terms, he was not aware he was doing that.  (The bird 
is not expected to play any role in refusing application to the question ‘Why?’)  Both 
acknowledging and refusing application of a certain question ‘Why?’ are part of the agent’s 
understanding of his action as goal-directed.  Refusing one application of the question makes the 
agent subject to some other application of it.  (“If you weren’t intentionally sawing the last plank 
of oak, then what were you doing?  What did you take yourself to be doing?”)  The answer to 
such a question gives the terms in which the action is to be seen as intentional (the point of the 
activity, the good of it, what is being pursued).  The role of the refusal of application to a 
particular ‘Why?’ question marks the fact that an action will have conditions of success or failure 
only as described in certain ways and not others.  In answering this question, an expression of 
intention spells out the aim that some piece of behavior is guided by and to which the person is 
seeking to conform the rest of his action (i.e., the larger actions in Anscombe’s ABCD structure).  
Aims have a linguistic structure in this sense, that the objects we handle in the world (and the 
movements we make in handling them) are multiply describable, and only a fraction of these 
descriptions will be relevant to what makes the results something aimed for. 
 
Second, only when intention is not merely indicated, but verbalized as a statement of 
what one is doing, do we see how its expression could be something in light of which a 
performance might be mistaken or corrected.  For only a statement – a claim upon the world 
established independently of the regularities it seeks to track -- could be in a position to impugn 
the facts.  The content of an expression of intention will have to be conventionally or 
linguistically determined if it is to serve as an independent standard of this sort.   
 
Finally, only a verbal expression of intention can directly display the unity of >intention= 
as it occurs in >intending to X= and Aan intentional action.=  For what is needed here is essentially 
the notion of expression we see at work in the description of what one is doing as, e.g., 
replenishing the water supply.  When it comes to human actions, “the description of what we are 
interested in is a type of description that would not exist if our question ‘Why?’ did not.” (p. 83) 
 
    Developing this formula, we might say:  For every answer to the special ‘Why?’ question 
there is a complementary answer to a special question 'What?', applied to someone’s 
performance.  That is, because ‘intentional’ applies to action itself (and not just to something in 
the mental history of the agent causing action), a true and positive answer to the question ‘Why?’ 
tells us not merely why some event is taking place, but also what is happening, in terms of an 
action being performed.  Thus, building on Anscombe’s remark that there isn’t “much to choose 
between [the answers] ‘She is making tea’ and ‘She is putting on the kettle in order to make tea – 
i.e., ‘She is going to make tea’?,” we might add:  There often isn’t much to choose between the 
questions "Why are you messing about with the kettle” and "What are you doing messing about 
with the kettle?"  The answer to either question will be an expression of intention in the sense 
canvassed here in terms of the predicates of “contradictability,” “commitment,” “world- 
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directedness,” and “mistake in performance.”  That the concept of intention applies across the 
performative spectrum, on the one hand, and that the answer to the special question ‘Why?’ tells 
us also what is happening, amount here to the same thing.  In action, the What appears together 
with – is already made for -- an answer to the question “Why?”  This serves to distinguish action 
from other phenomena in nature, where the identification of What is to be explained is 
independent of how its interrogation in terms of ‘Why?’ may turn out.
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 (2)  Anachronistically put, Anscombe shows what is at best optional in the contemporary 
view that we understand what intention is only by asking what the mental state of intending is 
and how it could causally contribute to the production of intentional action.  In place of this, she 
stresses the conceptual unity of a certain trinity:  a single concept at work along a spectrum of 
cases, including >pure= intending, intentions in action and intentional action.  There is irony in the 
fact that one of her aims was to break up the sense of sharp distinctions among the divisions she 
is credited with having discerned.  There is also a danger that recognition of this point will 
involve attributing to Anscombe the thesis that Aintention@ isn=t a mental state at all, as happens 
in the behaviorist reading.  But what Anscombe denies is only that we understand how to apply 
the notion of a Astate@ here, on the basis of its application in other contexts like those of belief 
and desire. 
 
In fact, TA inches toward the same conclusion, for its more recent discoveries might be 
represented like this:  No psychology will afford the right materials for explaining action which 
does not make use of a concept which applies throughout the spectrum of unfolding action, i.e., 
which has the same internal complexity as action itself.  Intuiting this, it becomes natural, within 
the framework of TA, to seek an enhanced psychology of states, one which might include such 
items as intending, planning or even believing or wanting in some special sense.  No doubt, there 
are such states of mind, in the anodyne sense that human agents do intend, plan, want, etc.  But 
the point to grasp is that leading one=s sense of the psychological materials needed (for 
connecting the various uses of intention) is a prior understanding of what intentional action is.  
To make that understanding explicit was Anscombe=s problem. 
  
To elaborate, suppose the contemporary action theorist inspired, by the felt necessities of 
his material, to introduce a special psychological state called Aintending@ or Aplanning@ (call it X-
ing:  the name doesn’t matter).  His avowed task is to analyze it and to explain the behaviour- 
involving uses of intention on the basis of their relation to it.  But if X-ing is even to seem to be 
fit for this employment, it had better admit of internally nested relations (parts and wholes) of the 
sort exhibited in explanations like: 
 
-- >A is X-ing to Ø because he is V-ing= (A is planning to buy lumber because he is 
building a tree-house:  the >state= of X-ing explained in terms of a larger whole of action.)
- >A is X-ing to Ø because he is X-ing to Ψ = (A is planning to buy lumber because he is 
planning to build a tree-house:  the >state= of X-ing explained by reference to a different 
occurrence of X-ing, one directed upon a wider description of the action.) 
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 - >A is V-ing because he is X-ing to Ø= (A is getting his car keys because he is planning 
to buy lumber:  an action explained by reference to the ‘state’ of X-ing.)     
 
The nature of the pressure to endow action theory with an enhanced psychology of states can be 
represented conscisely, in Anscombe’s terms, like this:  However we wish to understand the 
relevant action-theoretic state of X-ing, it ought to be the sort of thing about which it makes 
sense to ask >why= (i.e., for what purpose) one is X-ing-to-do-something, and to answer this by 
reference to other things one is X-ing-to-do or other things one is doing.  And of course the 
expression of this >state= will have to partake of the structure of contradiction, action-
characterization, and correction of performances (as identified through X-characterizing 
descriptions).   
  
 “Intending”  and  “planning,”  in idiomatic employments, do fit this special bill of 
requirements.  But, as our discussion should make clear, that is because the basic psychological 
item needed must be:  X-ing to do something.  That is, X-ing, whatever it is, must inherit through 
its object (a performance), just the distinctive structure characteristic of intentional action.  And 
as Anscombe=s problem was just to make that basic structure explicit, this suggests a route by 
which TA B after discoveries about the enhanced psychology of states it requires B might at 
length pay a more unqualified and accurate homage to Anscombe. 
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NOTES 
 
1   Or a “further intention in acting.”  These divisions play a structuring role in Anscombe’s discussion.  They 
explicitly appear at p. 1 (statement of the headings), p. 9 (the transition from “expression of intention” to 
“intentional action”), p. 40 (the unity of the three divisions), and p. 90 (return to “expression of intention for the 
future”).  And they are drawn on elsewhere in Anscombe’s discussion. 
 
2    “Where we are tempted to speak of ‘different senses’ of a word which is clearly not equivocal, we may 
infer that we are in fact pretty much in the dark about the character of the concept which it represents.”  Intention, p. 
1.  In this essay, we approach Anscombe’s ambitions in Intention in light of her sense of why the concept of 
“intention” calls for philosophy at all.  The answer evidently refers to a submerged unity in our otherwise familiar 
employments of “intention.”  What makes these all cases of “intention” does not immediately appear. 
 
3 Cf.  Intention, p. 5.   
 
4   On this distinction, see Richard Moran, ‘Problems of Sincerity’,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Volume 105, pp. 341 - 361 (December 2005). 
 
5   Or future statements of fact -- e.g., “Nurse will take you to the operating theatre”:  p 3. 
    
6   With Anscombe’s discussion of expression of intention vs. prediction, compare, e.g., Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, p. 224. 
 
7   This passage is obscure, even by Anscombian standards.  The term “expression” is idiomatically 
multivalent enough to embrace Wittgenstein’s talk of natural behaviour as “expressions” of intention.  So it is hardly 
obvious that what Anscombe wishes to deny must be the same thing Wittgenstein is asserting.  Further, Anscombe 
herself, turning to the question of “how…we tell someone’s intentions,” will point out that intentions are often 
legible in someone’s behavior:  “You will have a strong chance of success [at this] if you mention what he actually 
did or is doing.” (p. 7-8)  This only makes more pressing the question of what could be stake in her denial that 
natural behavioural manifestations of intentions are proper “expressions” of it.  See §§ V-VI below. 
 
8   Donald Davidson, “Introduction,” Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1985), p. xiii. 
 
9 Michael  Bratman,  Intention, Plans and Practical Reason, pp. 1, 3, 5 and n. 1.  Cf.  H. L. A. Hart, “Intention 
and Punishment,” in Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 117:  “Intention is to 
be divided into three related parts...The first I shall call “intentionally doing something’; the second “doing 
something with a further intention,” and the third “bare intention” because it is the case of intending to do something 
in the future without doing anything to execute this intention now.”  
 
10   “Reluctantly”:  Cf. Davidson, “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events, p. 88.  But if reasons, 
conceived as belief/desire pairs, seem adequate to explaining what it is to act intentionally, they appear immediately 
hopeless when it comes to “intending to act.”  One main problem is that the familiar conflicts which are present 
among an agent’s desires seem intolerable when it comes to her intentions; intentions seem to “commit” the agent in 
a way which mere desires do not.  This and other difficulties with belief/desire psychology in the theory of intention 
are discussed by Bratman in Intention, Plans and Practical Reason, ibid.  On the apparently commissive aspect of 
“intending,” see Bratman’s discussion at pp. 4-5, and our discussion infra, §VI. 
  Davidson’s reluctance, as opposed to Bratman’s boldness, will comprise only a superficial difference here. 
For the reluctance is only about recognizing “intention” as a sui generis state of mind (one not “ontologically 
reducible” to beliefs and desires: see Davidson “Intending,” p. 88, 83).  Both take for granted, however, the 
explanatory framework described in this section 
 
11       See infra, pp. ___, ___.   
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12   We shall generally use “intending” or “intention to act” for this category. 
 
13     “It would be astonishing if that extra element were foreign to our understanding of intentional action.”  
Davidson, Intending, p. 88; and see p. 89:  “[T]here is no reason not to allow that intention of exactly the same kind 
is also present when the intended action eventuates.”
 
14      See Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events p. xiii, and “Intending,” pp 87-88.
 
15      See Bratman, op. cit., pp. 5-6.  Anscombe says almost nothing in Intention about whether action 
explanations mention causes, save for an occasional suggestion that the relevant notions of “a cause,” and “causal” 
would have to be made clearer for us to understand what this question is about.  See e.g., §§ 5, 9-11. 
 
16   Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical Reason, p. 7 (p. 5 check?). 
 
17   Nor can we understand this on the basis of the agent’s having done something for a such a reason (say 
bought a ticket); for, by hypothesis, the intention in question may remain pure, the action merely proposed. 
 
18    Cf. Intention, p. 84:  “[T]he term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description of events” 
(Anscombe’s emphasis). 
 
19    One feature of this analogy seems worth highlighting.  Someone who, endeavoring to understand “wrongful,” 
started with the case in which it characterizes an agent’s plan would find themselves having to connect this to other 
cases through a story about such a plan bringing about –“in the right way” of course  – a situation in which a 
different, world-involving notion of wrongful finds application (e.g., to another’s loss or injury).  (And they might 
feel puzzled over how applications of the world-involving notion of “wrongful” – e.g., wrongful injury – could 
involve a greater degree of culpability, given the fortuitous role which factors beyond the agents control are bound 
to play in this extended story; but this is a distinguishable problem.)  Starting at the other end, one sees what makes 
a plan wrongful by seeing what happens when it succeeds.  This doesn’t occlude the possibility of causal 
explanations, but it suggests that the unity of the divisions can and perhaps must be grasped before they get under 
way.
 
20 See  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations §§629 – 660 (esp. 635, 645-46), pp. 216-17; Zettel 
44.  Anscombe alludes to this discussion on p. 6 of Intention. 
 
21  For a related discussion, see Anscombe, “Events in the Mind” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: 
Collected Papers Volume II, esp. pp. 57-61. 
 
22 Cf.  Intention, p. 77 on the absurdity of accepting both the empiricist idea of pleasure as an impression of 
some kind and seeing it as “quite generally the point of doing anything”.  Anscombe is adapting Investigations §218:  
"Meaning is not a process which accompanies a word.  For no process could have the consequences of meaning.” 
 
23      Cf. Intention, p. 92:  “Nor can we say:  But in the expression of intention one isn’t saying anything is going 
to happen! Otherwise, when I had said ‘I’m just going to get up’, it would be unreasonable later to ask ‘Why didn’t 
you get up?’.  I could reply: ‘I wasn’t talking about a future happening, so why do you mention such irrelevancies?”  
On Anscombe=s account, an expression of intention differs from a prediction in not being founded for the speaker on 
evidence or observation, as well as in the particular notion of Amistakeness@ we apply in connection with it. 
 
24   “Direct”:  i.e., knowledge not merely on the basis of an inference from how it is with the speaker.  Cf. 
Intention, p. 3:  A[N]or does the patient normally infer the information from the fact that the doctor said that; he 
would say that the doctor told him.@ 
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25     See Michael Thompson, “Naive Action Theory,” [cite].  Our presentation of the spectrum of intention owes 
a quite general debt to Thompson’s paper.  
 
26   On the contrast between states and performances (and taking time vs. going on for a time), see A. Kenny, 
Action, Emotion and Will (London, 1963), Ch. 8, to which we are indebted here. 
 
27   The use of intention which arises in considering how to understand a speaker (especially when the speaker 
is absent, e.g., -- “the author’s intention”) would appear to call for separate treatment, as it does not involve a notion 
of unfolding action.  In light of this case, it appears that Anscombe’s divisions are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. 
 
28   Anscombe is exploring here the disabling consequences of isolating one her divisions – intentional action -- 
from the others.  However, her overall point is more general:  Other distortions would arise from the isolation of any 
of the divisions. 
 
29    See J.L. Austin, ‘A Plea For Excuses’, in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1961). 
 
30    Thus, someone writing the word “action” may have a pure intention, at this moment, to write the letter “c.”  
But asking why they intend to write “c” will disclose this intention to be grounded in an action already underway:  
the pure intention to write “c” stands to writing the word “action” (once they have begun on the “a”) as writing the 
word “action” does to writing the sentence “An intention can exist…” and so on.  So pure intentions are everywhere.  
But that is because actions, underway but not yet completed, are everywhere; such actions are their grounds
.   
31    Michael Thompson, “Naive Action Theory” [cite] 
  
32    Thompson, “Naive Action Theory”  
 
33   Michael Bratman’s master term – planning – fits the bill of particulars here.  Unlike beliefs and (appetitive) 
desires, plans are wholes which rationalize their subparts, can be pure or impure, take a performance from as their 
object (“I plan to Ø”), are subject to the question “why” in the relevant sense (“for what purpose?”), can be 
commanded (“Plan to be there at 4:00!”), and so on.  Planning, in short, shares in the structure of action.  Nothing 
this wasn’t true of would even seem to be a good candidate for an intention-explaining psychological state. 
 
34   The instructive exception to this is the right-limit case, which, by definition, does not express imperfection 
and hence does not enter into action-explanation:  E.g., in answer to “Why?,” never the past-perfect (I Ø-ed), but 
only the past progressive (I was Ø-ing). 
 
35   See the previous discussion above, p. ______. 
 
36   This is sometimes missed because there is no imperative-form (AIntend to Ø!@).  However, nothing is easier 
than making someone=s intention B e.g., to return the book B the object of a command:  One simply orders them to 
return the book.  It might be objected that were intending really an etiolated form of performance, it ought to be 
possible to command someone to Aintend to return the book@ in perfect purity, i.e., APlan to return the book, but don=t 
actually return it!@  But the answer to this is that it is also impossible to command someone <to go ahead with 
returning the book without actually returning it.>  Intending to Ø stands to the progressive Ø-ing just as Ø-ing (or 
doing things in order to Ø) stands to successfully Ø-ing or having Ø-ed:  None can be commanded apart from the 
others. 
 
37  The italics are our notes.  
 
38   The relevant sense of the question “Why,” and the fact that positive answers to it are themselves 
expressions of intention, are mutually defining notions for Anscombe.   
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39 Cf.  Intention, p. 80:  Like Aristotle=s Apractical reasoning,@ the Aorder of questions >Why=? can be looked at 
as a device which reveals the order” in the diverse materials of action.  But Anscombe also points out:  It is “as 
artificial as Aristotle’s [construction]; for a series of questions ‘Why?’…with the appropriate answers, cannot occur 
very often.” 
 
40    Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §647 
 
41   This point appears twice in Intention:  pp. 5, 86-87. 
 
42   Cf. p. 8:  “[I]f you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, you will have a strong 
chance of success if you mention what he actually did or is doing.”  If intentions were not so legible, their personal 
expression would lack much of its point.  Such expression gives another warrant to expect behavior of a certain 
describable shape, and this implies a general capacity to recognize another’s behavior, when the time comes, as 
satisfying (or frustrating) those expectations. 
 
43   See, e.g., Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 97-98.  Relatedly, it is sometimes said that only 
linguistic creatures initiate action by deciding on it from among a range of alternatives.  And, no doubt, we speak of 
Adecisions,@ just where someone has, in effect, answered a question, or resolved their intentions against the 
background of other prospects.  But these points are moot here, for the reasons explained in the text. 
 
44   Davidson, AThought and Talk@ in Truth and Interpretation, p. 63. 
 
45   Indeed, Michael Tomasello’s reading of the empirical research on non-human primates defends just this 
position:   While brutes have intentions, they fail to recognize intentions – and hence to distinguish ends from 
means, and both from the upshots of what is done --  in others.  See The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, 
Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
46   Anscombe, “Under a Description” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 208-219.  This is in 
further explanation of her remark in Intention, pp 86-87:  “[W]e certainly ascribe intention to animals.  The reason is 
that we describe what they do in a manner perfectly characteristic of the use of intention concepts:  we describe what 
further they are doing in doing something…..We do this although the cat can utter no thoughts, and cannot give 
expression to any knowledge of its own action, or to any intentions either.”  
 
47  This is just what is happening, according to Donald Gustafson, one of the few commentators to notice the 
problem.  Concerned mainly to defend Wittgenstein, Gustafson criticizes Anscombe for overlooking this:  “[T]hat a 
person’s face has a determined look, while it does not imply that he expressed determination in the sense that his 
saying he is determined does so, is [nonetheless] an expression of determination or a determined expression”  The 
implication must be that AP joins no issue, since the impersonal sense in which Wittgenstein is asserting that the 
stalking cat expresses an intention isn’t the personal sense in which Anscombe would be denying it.  This resolution 
comes at the cost of making Anscombe incoherent, however.  For if her point were merely that animals don’t 
express their intentions in the personal sense -- i.e., don’t tell us of them -- then she ought to have said the reverse of 
what she does:  Intention is just like emotion in this respect, for animals don’t tell us of their emotions, or of their 
hopes and fears, either. 
 
48   In point of fact, ordinary usage gives AP some support.  One can express one’s intention to turn right by 
making a hand gesture (since this is a “bodily movement with a conventional meaning”: p. 5); but someone who 
begins to turn right is not “expressing an intention” to do so, even though that same movement might express his 
determination or his fear, and even though it may make his intentions (e.g., to turn right, to confuse the enemy, etc.) 
apparent to an observer.  We need to see more clearly, however, what distinction language is harboring here. 
   
49   Of course, numerous states of the person – e.g., a dulling throbbing in one’s right knee, a slow, spreading  
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fear in the pit of one’s stomach – are manifested only in creatures who have the linguistic means to differentiate and 
report them.  So conventional expression goes beyond natural expression.  But the present point isn’t that 
conventional expression only deputizes for what is already expressible by non-verbal behaviour, only that it 
sometimes does. 
 
50   Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 189. 
 
51   Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 242, Zettel §545. 
 
52   See Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, volume II, § 179:  “There is no cry of 
intention” -- i.e., as there is a cry of pain, joy, grief, etc.   
 
53   Even God’s intentions, in so far as they are not expressed but merely revealed by history, do not impugn 
anything.  For example, the regularity of the seasons does not afford a basis – as a verbal expression would -- for 
regarding unseasonable rain as a divine mistake.  See Anscombe, “Rule, Rights and Promises,” in Ethics, Religion 
and Politics:  Collected Philosophical Papers Vol. III (Blackwell, 1981), p. 99:  “God himself can make no promises 
to man except in a human language.” 
The point of Anscombe’s denying that an incipient course of action expresses intention (as a face or tone of 
voice expresses anger) might be approached another way, by considering what might serve to distinguish impersonal 
“expressions” from other signs or indications of a person’s state.  As Anscombe elsewhere remarks, “A man could 
be said not to have given expression to his anger at all—he merely brought it about that the man who had offended 
him was ruined or hanged.”  “Pretending” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind:  Collected Philosophical 
Papers, Vo. II (University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 88.   According to this, an expression is not a mere sign or 
indication, but what exactly is the difference?  It seems correct to say:  An expression allows for the possibility of 
retaining the concept in cases where what is expressed is absent; a mere sign or indication does not.  Thus, we may 
say that the relation “X expresses Y” excludes cases in which the truth of the statement depends on the truth or 
actuality of Y.  To illustrate:  Ruining him is not an expression of anger, for it is not anger which is expressed at all 
unless the person really is angry.  In contrast, if X expresses Y, then Y is itself present in the expression X, as e.g., 
anger is present in the angry furrows in the face, whatever the person’s state of mind.  Hence it is possible to be 
surprised that (e.g.) a face expresses anger (e.g., since this person has no cause for complaint), whereas – since a 
person’s action only manifests an intention to do what they are really doing or intending to do -- there can't  be any 
surprise that a bit of behavior manifests an intention to do such-and-such.  Considered apart from their verbal 
expressability, intentions are sunk in facticity.  This is why Anscombe suggests an analogy between the movements 
of the cat (as a basis for attributing intentions) and the car’s stalling engine.  Just as the engines behavior indicates 
that the car is going to stop only if the car is going to stop, so the movements of the cat indicate only what it actually 
goes on to do. 
 
54   For more on the notion of practical knowledge, see Richard Moran, "Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'", 
in Agency and Action, eds. J. Hyman & H. Steward, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 43-68 
(Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 55). 
,  
55   The source of the phrase ‘direction of fit’ as attributed to Anscombe seems to be Mark Platts, Ways of 
Meaning (Routledge, 1979), pp. 256-7.  The transformation of her idea is already complete in this short passage, 
which re-writes her original thought about the relation between an expression of intention and what the person does 
as a claim about the relation between a state (desire) and the world:   “Miss Anscombe, in her work on intention, has 
drawn a broad distinction between two kinds of mental state, factual belief being the prime exemplar of one kind 
and desire a prime exemplar of the other (Anscombe, Intention, § 2).  The distinction is in terms of the direction of 
fit of mental states with the world.”   
 
56   See Luca Ferrero, “Intending and Doing” (manuscript), which stresses the active quality of such “waiting” 
(monitoring for interferences, commitment of resources, etc) in the usual case. 
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57   See Donald Davidson, “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events, p. 90. 
 
58   See the opening quotation from Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 74. 
 
59  Or better, their “being engaged in doing something”:  the word “engaged” straddles the sense of (1) doing 
something and (2) being committed – in a non-promissory sense – to doing something. 
 
60   We agree with Ferrero’s conclusion (note 51 above) that intending is a kind of performance which is 
continuous in structure with intentional action, so that that to intend to Φ to is be (already) engaged in Φ -ing.  As 
Ferrero puts it, “[F]uture directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or 
the acting itself.  Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action.” 
    
61  In this connection, see recent work of Pamela Hieronymi, where actions as well as attitudes are not only 
understood as embodying reasons, but more specifically where the relevant notion of 'reason' is the more articulated 
one of "a consideration that bears on a question", as distinct from the more primitive one of “a consideration in favor 
of” (which might apply equally to considerations in favor of having some belief as well as to considerations in favor 
of its truth).  In "The Wrong Kind of Reason," The Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 9 (September 2005): 437-57; and 
"Controlling Attitudes," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (March 2006): 45-74, the appeal to the 
applicability of a certain range of questions as constituting the action or the attitude is motivated in part by reference 
to Anscombe's 'Why?' question. 